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 Abstract 
In behavioral ecology some authors regard the innateness concept as irretrievably 
confused whilst others take it to refer to adaptations. In cognitive psychology, however, 
whether traits are 'innate' is regarded as a significant question and is often the subject of 
heated debate. Several philosophers have tried to define innateness with the intention of 
making sense of its use in cognitive psychology. In contrast, I argue that the concept is 
irretrievably confused. The vernacular innateness concept represents a key aspect of 
'folkbiology', namely, the explanatory strategy that psychologists and cognitive 
anthropologists have labeled 'folk essentialism'. Folk essentialism is inimical to 
Darwinism, and both Darwin and the founders of the modern synthesis struggled to 
overcome this way of thinking about living systems. Because the vernacular concept of 
innateness is part of folkbiology, attempts to define it more adequately are unlikely to 
succeed, making it preferable to introduce new, neutral terms for the various, related 
notions that are needed to understand cognitive development. 
 What is innateness? 
In molecular developmental biology innateness seems as antiquated a theoretical 
construct as instinct and equally peripheral to any actual account of gene regulation or 
morphogenesis. In behavioral ecology, some authors regard the innateness concept as 
irretrievably confused and the term ‘innate’ as one all serious scientific workers should 
eschew (Bateson, 1991) whilst others claim that the popular demand to know if 
something is ‘in our genes’ is best construed as a question about whether a trait is an 
adaptation (Symons, 1992: 141).  In cognitive psychology, however, whether a trait is 
innate is still regarded as a significant question and is often the subject of heated debate 
(Cowie, 1999). In an attempt to clarify what is at issue in these debates, philosophers 
have proposed numerous analyses of the concept of innateness. Some years ago, Stephen 
Stich defined innateness as the disposition to appear in the normal course of 
development, that is, to be part of the typical or normal phenotype of that kind of 
organism (Stich, 1975). More recently, Andre Ariew has analysed innateness in terms of 
developmental canalization, a phenomena which he uses to clarify the intuitive idea that 
the innate traits are insensitive to variation in the developmental environment (Ariew, 
1996; Ariew, 1999). William Wimsatt has explicated innateness using his concept of 
'generative entrenchment': innate traits are those upon which many other features of the 
organism are built and whose presence is therefore essential for normal development 
(Wimsatt, 1986, 1999). Fiona Cowie and Richard Samuels have both offered 
methodological analyses of innateness (Cowie, 1999; Samuels, Forthcoming). Samuels 
argues that innate traits are 'psychological primitives' - traits that that are mentioned in 
psychological explanations but which are not amenable to the explanatory strategies that 
define psychology as a scientific domain. Psychology appeals to innate traits in its 
explanations, but the explanation of the innate traits themselves lies outside psychology. 
Cowie identifies a number of different roles that the innateness concept has played in 
particular episodes in the history of philosophy and psychology, one of which resembles 
that described by Samuels. In my view, each of these proposals correctly identifies a 
belief or an intellectual strategy that lies behind the use of the term 'innate' in certain 
specific research contexts. None of them, however, is an adequate account of the concept 
of innateness. 
 
In an earlier work I have argued, following a number of developmental psychologists and 
behavioral ecologists2, that the concept of innateness conflates a number of independent 
biological properties and is thus a confusing and unhelpful notion with which to 
understand behavioral or cognitive development (Griffiths, 1997).  Three broad ideas are 
bundled together in the innateness concept: 
 
· Developmental fixity  
· Species nature  
· Intended outcome 
 
For reasons that will become clear below, all three terms refer to clusters of related ideas 
and show up in different forms in different historical, cultural and intellectual contexts. 
'Developmental fixity' means that the trait is in some sense 'hard to change': it is 
insensitive to environmental inputs in development; its development is or appears goal-
directed, so that when prevented from developing in one way it develops in another; 
changing it disrupts or impairs development. 'Species nature' means that innate traits 
reflect what it is to be an organism of that kind, with consequent associations of typicality 
or universality. 'Intended outcome' means that innate traits are how the organism is meant 
to develop; to lack them is to be malformed; environments that disrupt them are 'bad 
rearing', to use Konrad Lorenz’s term. This intentional or normative element of the 
innateness concept is today usually assimilated to the idea of design by natural selection: 
innate traits are those that the organism is designed to possess or which are programmed 
in its genes. In my earlier work I identified scientific descendants of these three clusters 
of ideas, namely, being insensitive to environmental factors in development, being 
universal in the species (I now prefer the less specific phrase ‘species-typical’) and being 
the product of adaptive evolution. I argued that because these three are empirically 
disassociated, a theoretical construct that conflates them is undesirable. In particular, such 
a construct will give rise to illicit inferences from the presence of one biological property 
to the presence of the others.  
 
In this paper I want to simultaneously defend my earlier view and offer a deeper 
diagnosis of the problem. The innateness concept is an expression of 'folk essentialism' - 
a distinctive feature of pre-scientific thought about animate things ('folkbiology'). Folk 
essentialism understands biological species as the manifestation of underlying 'natures' 
shared by all members of a species. The three aspects of the innateness concept that I 
identified are all elements of folk essentialism. Since folk essentialism is both false and 
fundamentally inconsistent with the Darwinian view of species, it should be rejected. 
However, folk essentialism is at the very least a widespread human cognitive trait, 
probably pancultural, and quite possibly a canalized outcome of cognitive development. 
Because 'innate' is a common term whose vernacular meaning embodies this way of 
thinking about living systems, attempts to stipulate a new, restricted meaning for this 
word are unlikely to be successful. In any case, proposals for linguistic form should be 
formulated with the intention of promoting a more accurate understanding of living 
systems, not preserving intuitions that reflect folkbiology. The several proposed 
explications listed above each describe a genuine biological property and several others 
are needed to adequately describe all the phenomena that innateness has been invoked to 
explain. Therefore, I suggest, the use of new, neutral terms for each of these several 
properties is preferable to trying to retain the term 'innate' for one or more of them. 
Innateness in behavioral science 
Patrick Bateson lists seven different senses in which the term ‘innate’ has been used in 
animal behavior studies (Bateson, 1991:21): 
 
· Present at birth 
· A behavioral difference caused by a genetic difference 
· Adapted over the course of evolution 
· Unchanging through development 
· Shared by all members of the species 
· Not learned 
· A distinctly organized system of behavior driven from within3 
 
To this list we can add an eight sense, that of being something that can be taken as given 
with respect to the set of causal factors currently under investigation. This sense is 
particularly prevalent in psychology, where 'innate' traits are those that are to be 
explained biologically rather than psychologically (Cowie, 1999; Samuels, Forthcoming). 
Bateson’s sixth sense, in which the innate traits are simply the complement of the learnt 
traits, is perhaps an instance of this, eighth sense, reflecting the domination of psychology 
by learning theory in the period when ethology was reviving the concept of an innate 
trait. The use of innateness in this last sense as a way to block a demand for explanation 
can make ascriptions of innateness the subject of considerable controversy, especially 
when scientists disagree about explanatory priorities or disciplinary boundaries. This is 
one reason why the reintroduction of the innateness concept to animal behavior studies 
by Konrad Lorenz and other early ethologists (Lorenz, 1952) provoked immediate 
hostility from developmental psychobiologists (Johnston, 2001; Lehrman, 1953). 
Developmental scientists rejected the innateness concept for the same reason they had 
rejected the instinct concept earlier in the century – these concepts are used to signal that 
the traits in question can be treated as given and developmental scientists are engaged in 
elucidating their origins!  
 
However, the disagreement between Lorenz and his critics was not merely a clash 
between competing explanatory interests and disciplinary orientations. Developmentally 
oriented scientists argued that ethologists were using the innateness concept to make 
invalid inferences via fallacies of ambiguity. The properties of developmental fixity, 
universality and evolutionary origin were freely inferred from one another when 
developmentalists knew them to be empirically disassociated. The traditional notion of 
universality itself conflates the two very different properties of being monomorphic and 
being pancultural. A trait is monomorphic if only one form of that trait is found in a 
species - the inability to synthesise vitamin C and the elevation of the heart rate in fear 
are monomorphic human traits. In contrast, a trait is pancultural if it is found in all 
cultures. Many pan-cultural traits, such as hair color and susceptibility to early-onset 
diabetes, are polymorphic: more than one form of the trait exists in the same species. 
Neither being monomorphic nor being pancultural has any very strong connection to 
being the result of adaptive evolution. Evolution is as capable of producing 
polymorphisms as monomorphisms and some non-adaptive evolutionary mechanisms, 
such as developmental constraint, are likely to produce monomorphic traits. Nor need 
evolved traits be pancultural, as evolutionary psychologists are fond of pointing out. 
Different cultural environments can systematically induce different developmental 
outcomes (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). In this respect different cultures can resemble the 
different ecological zones that induce the same species of plant to develop in utterly 
different ways, as, for example, a low-growing shrub at high altitudes and an upright tree 
at lower altitudes. The relationship between having an evolutionary explanation and 
exhibiting developmental fixity is equally problematic. There is no intrinsic tendency for 
evolved traits to be buffered against variation in environmental inputs to development. 
Developmental psychobiologists since Lehrman have documented innumerable cases in 
which evolved developmental outcomes require a rich and highly specific developmental 
environment. In rhesus macaques, for example, the recognition of emotional expressions 
in conspecifics and the ability to cooperate in agonistic interactions depend on infant 
social interaction for their development (Mason, 1985). These findings throw no doubt 
whatever on the claim that these abilities in adult macaques are the result of adaptive 
evolution. The constructive role of environmental factors in the development of evolved 
traits should come as no surprise.  Selection cannot favor a trait that compensates for the 
loss of a developmental input that is, as a matter of fact, reliably available. Evolution 
does not anticipate future contingencies. In fact, such alternative developmental pathways 
will be dismantled by mutation if a developmental input becomes readily available, as 
happened in the primate lineage with the pathway used by most other mammals to 
synthesize their own vitamin C (Jukes & King, 1975). Finally, as developmental 
scientists have reiterated ever since Lehrman, universality and developmental fixity 
cannot be equated. Ariew uses this point to argue against Stich’s earlier analysis of the 
innateness concept: the fact that a trait is invariant across normal environments leaves it 
entirely open whether this is because the trait is insensitive to environmental factors or 
because the causally relevant factors are invariant across normal environments (Ariew, 
1999: 134). In this argument, of course, Ariew is using intuitions driven by one element 
of the innateness concept (developmental fixity) to argue against an explication that 
focuses on another (universality/species typicality). Ariew’s argument is correct, but 
Stich could equally well reply by using intuitions about species-typicality to argue against 
Ariew’s explication in terms of developmental fixity.  
 
In the light of the developmental critique of the innateness concept, some ethologists 
rejected it entirely, as can be seen in Bateson’s work and in that of Robert Hinde (Hinde, 
1968). Others used the notion of a genetic program to allow them to ignore development 
in the context of studying evolution while admitting that evolved phenotypic traits are 
contingent upon a host of other factors in development. Konrad Lorenz took this route in 
his latter work, denying that phenotypic traits could be meaningfully described as innate 
and asserting instead that “certain parts of the information which underlie the adaptedness 
of the whole, and which can be ascertained by the deprivation experiment, are 
innate.”(Lorenz, 1965: 40). Something like this approach has become orthodox in 
contemporary behavioral ecology although it is now more usual to say directly that a trait 
is programmed in the genes than to make a detour through the concept of innateness. 
 
Folkbiology and folk essentialism 
The term ‘folkbiology’ refers both to pre-scientific thought about the animate realm and 
to the field of research which studies it (Medin & Atran, 1999). Research in folkbiology 
is conducted both by cognitive anthropologists, who set out to describe and explain 
patterns of reasoning about the living world in various human cultures and by cognitive 
psychologists who study the emergence of these patterns of reasoning in children and 
their manifestation in adults under controlled conditions. Folkbiological research in 
cognitive anthropology has revealed some apparently pancultural features of human 
thought about the animate realm (Atran, 1990, 1999; Berlin, 1992, 1999; Coley, Medin, 
Profitt, Lynch, & Atran, 1999). Although classifications of living things are culturally 
specific, the form of these classifications is the same everywhere. Organisms are 
classified hierarchically, with five distinctive taxonomic levels: folk kingdom (e.g. plant, 
animal); life form (e.g. tree, mammal), generic species (e.g; oak, dog); folk specific (e.g. 
white oak, poodle); folk varietal (e.g. spotted white oak, toy poodle). This hierarchical 
taxonomy is used in inductive inference: the degree of confidence with which observed 
properties of one organism are projected to another organism is predicted by their 
taxonomic distance from one another in the local scheme of classification. Categories at 
the generic species level are inductively privileged: higher level categories support fewer 
and weaker inductive inferences while lower level categories add little to the strength or 
number of inferences. Generic species are thus the level at which folkbiological 
reasoning operates most powerfully. 
 
Folkbiology research by cognitive psychologists has produced a number of intriguing 
results. Children think in distinctive ways about the cognitive domain of living things, a 
domain which itself seems to develop in a distinctive manner from an earlier domain of  
animate (self-moving) things which includes some things that are not alive and excludes 
plants (Carey, 1985, 1988). Children of kindergarten age presume that each kind of 
organism possesses some unobservable property that explains the distinctive observable 
properties of that kind of organism and which preserves the specific identity of an 
organism through massive changes in its observable properties (Keil, 1989). This pattern 
of reasoning is very different with the same children’s reasoning about artifacts. The 
specific identity of artifacts depends on their observable properties and, as children 
develop further, on those observable properties most relevant to the performance of their 
intended function. Specific identity is not preserved through change in these observable 
features: a screwdriver ground down to make an awl is not still ‘really’ a screwdriver. 
The pattern of thought that seems to imply the existence of some underlying, 
unobservable property which guarantees identity has been labeled ‘psychological 
essentialism’ by Douglas Medin (Medin & Ortony, 1989), but here I will refer to it as 
‘folk essentialism’: 
 
“People act as if things (e.g. objects) have essences or underlying natures that 
make them the things that they are. Furthermore, the essence constrains or 
generates properties that may vary in their centrality” (Medin, 1989: 1476) 
 There is considerable controversy about whether these results should be interpreted as 
support for the existence of a ‘theory’ of living things in young children or for ‘beliefs’ 
about species and their essences (Downes, 1999). This, fortunately, is an issue that does 
not need to be settled for the purposes of this paper. I can also remain agnostic on the 
question of how specific the essentialistic pattern of inference is to the biological domain 
and certain others (Gelman & Hirschfeld, 1999). All I require for my argument here is 
that there exists an essentialistic strategy of explanation in folkbiology. Just as Scott 
Atran has argued that the hierachical taxonomy of early modern biology was derived 
from folk taxonomy (Atran, 1990), I argue that a cluster of biological concepts, such as 
the pre-Darwinian concept of species, the concept of human nature and the innateness 
concept, derive from essentialism in folkbiology.  
Innateness and folk essentialism 
It is uncontroversial that the scientific concept of species emerged smoothly from pre-
scientific practice of categorizing organisms into folk species. Folkbiological species 
categories are understood in terms of an underlying essence which is shared by all 
members of the species and which makes each individual the kind of organism that it is. 
This is precisely the ‘typological’ perspective on species that Darwin had to displace in 
order to establish the gradual transformation of one species into another. Species are not 
types to which individual organisms more or less imperfectly conform, but abstractions 
from the pools of overlapping variation that constitute the actual populations of that 
species, a perspective that Ernst Mayr christened ‘populational thinking’ (Mayr, 1976). 
Folk taxonomy allows traditional societies to interact effectively with the common plants 
and animals of their region because at a particular time and place species are often clearly 
separated from one another. The limitations of folk taxonomy become apparent when 
working on larger geographical and temporal scales. Many species grade into one another 
spatially and all do so temporally. When, individuals exist who are intermediate between 
two species due to hybridisation or incomplete speciation, it is senseless to ask whether 
these individuals are ‘really’ of one species or the other. That question presumes that the 
species is more than an abstraction from the varied individuals that compose it.  
 Elliott Sober has argued that the crucial element of Mayr’s distinction between 
‘typological’ and ‘populational’ perspectives lies in their approach to individual variation 
(Sober, 1980). The typological perspective sees variation as deviation from a ‘natural 
state’ that is the same for all individuals of that kind. Variant individuals are understood 
in terms of the natural state that they have failed to achieve. The Darwinian approach to 
variation, in contrast, regards species as pools of variation, has no concept of ideal type 
and treats the current average, modal or typical organism as a temporary reflection of an 
ongoing process of change. Unlike the typological perspective, the populational 
perspective does not lead to the expectation that species will be confined within a ‘circle 
of variation’, as so many of Darwin’s critics supposed. In this way, Darwin’s 
achievement lies as much in having transformed the question of the origin of species as in 
having answering it. The original ‘mystery of mysteries’ (Herschel, 1966 (1830) quoted 
in Darwin, 1964 (1859): 1) was why different ideal types of organism are realized in 
different historical epochs. In Darwin’s hands, the question became how individual 
organisms, albeit clustered together as groups of more or less similar organisms, are 
succeeded by slightly different individual organisms. Throughout his work, Darwin can 
be found arguing against the idea that there is a normal or ideal type of each species. In 
The Descent of Man, for example, he argues that medical representations of human 
anatomy are merely useful abstractions from a mass of slightly different arrangements of 
parts, and even slightly different collections of parts (Darwin, 1981 (1871): 107-111). 
 
Folkbiology regards essences as shared by all members of a species and uses a natural 
state model of variation in which variant individuals are seen as deviations from an ideal 
type. This much is supported by empirical research, as I briefly described in the last 
section. But I suggest that there are other aspects of folk essentialism that have been less 
thoroughly investigated. First, essences are conceived as striving to realize themselves. A 
trait linked to an organism’s essence will tend to reassert itself when the distorting 
influence that prevented its development is removed. Second, essences have normative 
overtones, so that variant individuals are not merely different but deviant. Individuals 
who deviate from their natural state are not as healthy and flourishing as normal 
individuals and no good can come of such deviation from the natural course of things. 
These claims are, of course, testable by the usual methods of folkbiology and cognitive 
developmental psychology, but in the absence of an existing empirical literature I can 
only provide anecdotal evidence in their support4. Consider one of the most enduring of 
science fictions, H.G Wells’s The Island of Dr Moreau, in which a scientist sets out to 
turn animals into men. Dr Moreau’s creations tend to revert to their original type, even in 
modern retellings of the story in which he has transformed their genomes. Eventually, 
they become monsters and destroy him. First published in the 1890s, Dr Moreau was a 
response to the new science of developmental mechanics (entwickelungsmechanik), as 
well as a reflection of contemporary revulsion at the use of vivisection. Ten years earlier, 
scientists such as Wilhelm Roux had set out to transform embryology from a descriptive 
to an experimental science, manipulating physical and chemical variables to uncover their 
role in development and throw light on the mechanisms of cell differentiation and 
morphogenesis. Some of their results were the very stuff of science fiction, as when Hans 
Driesch succeeded in cloning the sea urchin by mechanically separating the products of 
the first cell division. Surely the production of humans in the laboratory was only a few 
years away! In the novel, Dr Moreau exploits the mechanical ‘laws of growth’ envisioned 
by scientists like Roux to redirect the development of his animals toward the human 
form. The novel has been filmed three times5 and by 1996 Moreau had become a genetic 
engineer, manipulating the DNA of his unfortunate victims. It is striking that Wells’s plot 
is as satisfying to contemporary audiences, against this very different scientific 
background, as it was over a century ago. The ‘laws of growth’ and the genes can play 
exactly the same role, as extraordinarily powerful tools for deflecting nature from its 
course, but which are unable to change the essence of the organism. Moreau continues to 
lament that continual intervention is needed to prevent ‘the beast’ from reasserting itself, 
and his vision of creating an exact human copy still ends in death at the hands of his 
unnatural creations. The first of the two ideas that drive the plot forward, the idea of the 
essence reasserting itself, seems to me an inevitable concomitant of the explanatory role 
of essences in folkbiology. Essences explain the fact that all members of a species 
resemble one another because the essence generates the resemblance. The children in one 
of Keil’s experiments discussed above are sure that a raccoon manipulated to resemble 
and behave like a skunk will give birth to baby raccoons, presumably because it will pass 
on to them the essence of raccoon rather than that of skunk (Keil, 1989). The generative 
power of essences is primarily used to explain reproduction, but it also explains 
regeneration, as when dyed hair grows back in its natural color or a coppiced tree grows 
new trunks. It is this imperfect capacity for regeneration that is, I suggest, the 
folkbiological basis for the reversion of Moreau’s creations. The second idea, that 
individuals who deviate from their natural state are malformed or monstrous is all too 
familiar. The idea that health, happiness and morality can all be achieved by living in 
accordance with our nature did not need Rousseau to give it currency.  
 
I have suggested that folk essentialism involves belief in unobservable essences shared by 
all members of a species, which explain the normal characteristics of the species, which 
reassert themselves when these characteristics are interfered with and deviation from 
which is viewed as normatively wrong. This complex of ideas can be conveyed in our 
own case by the term ‘human nature’. Human nature is both evidenced by and used to 
explain universal (or typical) human traits: “Jealousy is found in all cultures – it’s part of 
human nature.” Human nature is used to argue for the futility of interference: “It’s no use 
trying to remove gender differences, they’re part of human nature.” Finally, the idea that 
ethical questions can be investigated by asking what it is to be truly or fully human has 
had followers from Aristotle to contemporary ‘perfectionism’ (Hurka, 1993). The idea of 
human nature is, I suggest, the application of folk essentialism to our own case. Human 
nature is also a near synonym for the innate features of human beings. If you give a 
popular science talk and assert that, say, addictive behavior is part of human nature you 
can count on your audience interpreting this to mean that addictive behavior is innate. It 
is hard to change, found in all cultures, and so forth. Conversely, if something is innate, 
then it is at least reasonable to refer to it as a part of human nature. I think this is true 
even of diseases that are described as innate. We are ‘naturally’ disposed to suffer from 
some diseases, such as those of old age. If innateness differs from human nature it is, 
perhaps, in having weaker normative overtones. I conclude, then, that the vernacular 
concept of innateness is also an expression of folk essentialism.  
Doing without innateness 
The innateness concept continues to promote the conflation of different biological 
properties in the ways that brought it into disrepute in animal behavior studies fifty years 
ago. Innateness allows writers to move illicitly from the view that a trait has an adaptive 
history to the view that it is insensitive to environmental influences in development. 
Popular discussions of rape or sexual jealousy inspired by contemporary evolutionary 
psychology assume that we have to live with these aspects of ‘human nature’ despite the 
clearest theoretical commitment by evolutionary psychologists to the dependence of 
evolved traits on the developmental environment. Conversely, developmental fixity is 
seen as a precondition of evolutionary explanation despite the massive evidence to the 
contrary. Social constructionists applaud research that shows developmental plasticity 
because they believe it removes the trait in question from the biological realm. In another 
set of invalid inference, universality, in either of its senses, is taken to be the hallmark of 
adaptive evolution, hence the efforts devoted by some evolutionary psychologists to 
documenting universality and by social constructionists to documenting cultural 
difference. The continuing focus on universality against the background of universal 
acceptance that evolution produces polymorphic outcomes is, I believe, due in no small 
part to the continuing use of theoretical constructs like innateness and human nature that 
conflate distinct these distinct biological properties. 
 
It is, of course, possible to define ‘innate’ in a way that makes use of only some limited 
set of its connotations. But all three aspects of the innateness concept are important and 
however the term ‘innate’ is redefined, terms will be needed to refer to the aspects of the 
concept this stipulation has excluded. In fact, each of these three broad ideas needs to be 
further subdivided to mark critical biological distinctions. Furthermore, innateness is a 
term in common use, and one that represents a highly intuitive way of thinking about 
living systems. This existing system of thought acts as a sink that draws new, stipulative 
usages back towards the established use. Substituting what you actually mean whenever 
you feel tempted to use the word ‘innate’ is an excellent way to resist this slippage of 
meaning. If a trait is found in all healthy individuals or is pancultural, then say so. If it 
has an adaptive-historical explanation, then say that. If it is developmentally canalized 
with respect to some set of inputs or is generatively entrenched, then say that it is. If the 
best explanation of a certain trait differences in a certain population is genetic, then call 
this a genetic difference. If you mean that the trait is present early in development, what 
could be simpler than to say so? If, finally, you want to ‘blackbox’ the development of a 
trait for the purposes of your current investigation then saying so will prevent your less 
methodologically reflective colleagues from supposing that you think the trait is …innate. 
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1 To appear in The Monist, Special Issue, edited by Kim Sterelny. 
2 Elements of this critique have been made many times by many authors in the last sixty years. I myself was 
drawing on (Bateson, 1991; Gray, 1992; Johnston, 1987; Lickliter & Berry, 1990; Oyama, 1990). 
3 A conception of the unit of mental evolution from classical ethology which resonates strongly with the 
idea of a 'mental module' found in contemporary evolutionary psychology (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 
1992). 
4  What follows looks very much like an analysis of the concepts of essence, human nature and innateness 
by appeals to ‘linguistic intuition’. I am, indeed, trying to analyse these concepts, but I make no pretension 
to have access to a special realm of conceptual truths. This is speculative folkbiology built on anecdotal 
evidence. 
5 In 1932 as Island of the Damned with Charles Laughton in the title role, and twice under its original title, 
with Kirk Douglas as the 70s Moreau still resorting to vivisection and Marlon Brando in 1996 injecting his 
victims with human DNA. 
